IRISH HISTORY SINCE 1850
2. An Gorta Mór
3. The Land League
4. Parnell and Home Rule
5. Unionism
6. The Cultural Revival
7. Home Rule
8. The Easter Rebellion
9. The War of Independence
10. The Free State: '20s
11. The Free State: '30s
12. The Troubles: '60s & '70s
13. The Troubles: '80s & '90s
14. The Celtic Tiger
15. Death of the Tiger
16. Sources
The Troubles in the 1960s and 1970s
The roots of Northern Ireland's conflict became apparent in the 1950s and 1960s. These were:
- An economic downturn in traditional industries such as shipbuilding weakened the Protestant community's sense of security.
- A belief grew amongst the Catholic community that they were being discriminated against by the unionist government controlling the Stormont parliament.
- Protestants became suspicious that the Catholic population was seeking to take over by promoting a united Ireland with the subsequent domination of the Catholic religion.
- A rising educated Catholic middle-class demanded reform of a political and social system that discriminated against them.
- Concern grew within the British government and civil service that Northern Ireland was a state lacking modernization and equality.
Then, in 1968, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed. It was a movement that demanded equal rights for Catholics in Northern Ireland, and its appearance marked the beginning of a mass movement that would galvanize politics and lead to a series of street demonstrations that gave birth to 30 years of violence
NICRA and other civil rights organizations (e.g., the Campaign for Social Justice) argued that Northern Ireland was a discriminatory state that only served the interests of the Protestant community. Despite attempts at reform by the unionist Prime Minister Terence O'Neill, there was a feeling of too little, too late
NICRA made a number of demands to make Northern Ireland a fairer society for everyone to live in. These were to:
- Defend the basic freedoms of all citizens including access to housing, jobs, and welfare.
- Protect the religious and political rights of the individuals.
- Highlight all abuses of power.
- Guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, and association.
- Inform the public of their lawful rights.
NICRA's initial demands related specifically to equality for the Catholic population. They were not attempting to destroy or undermine Northern Ireland and break the relationship with Britain.
NICRA took to the streets in a series of public marches to promote their cause. These marches met with counter-demonstrations from Protestant and unionist groups that often turned violent. Fearing an escalation in street violence, the Stormont government banned NICRA marches
In 1968 and 1969 Northern Ireland spiraled towards violence. A civil rights movement that sought social, rather than explicitly political, changes that would threaten the territorial status of Northern Ireland, had been met with a violent response from a Protestant and unionist community who feared their motivations. Riots, arson attacks, and physical assaults became common
The police force was stretched, and did not have the support of the Catholic community. The difficult question was how the situation could be brought under control.
On August 12, 1969 a traditional Apprentice Boys parade took place in Derry. Such parades were seen as inflammatory by the Catholic community not because they celebrated the victory of Protestant King William over Catholic King James in the seventeenth century, but because the marchers insisted on parading through the only areas of the city where Catholics were allowed to live. Imagine a parade of Nazis through Jerusalem, or a parade of white supremacists through Watts. The parade led to intense rioting, and an escalation of sectarian violence in Derry and across Northern Ireland that the police could not contain. In an attempt to restore order the decision was taken, on 15 August 1969, to send British troops onto the streets of Northern Ireland
Initially, both Protestants and Catholics welcomed the troops because:
- The police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was exhausted and could no longer contain the situation
- There existed a belief amongst the Catholic population that the RUC was no longer a neutral force, as many of its members were also members of Protestant paramilitary organizations.
- Acts of violence were not restricted to street rioting, but were taking on a sectarian dimension. Many Catholics and Protestants were burnt out of their homes by arsonists from the opposing side.
- It was felt, especially amongst Catholics, that the troops would protect Catholics from Protestant rioters, and that they would be politically neutral as they did their job.
The troops did initially calm the situation and violence reduced in intensity for a while. The political situation did not stabilize however. The voice of nationalism became stronger, and their demands for reform louder, with the formation of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). At the same time the ruling unionist government began to fracture. While some in the party argued for further social and political reforms that would produce a fairer society, others clung to their belief that unionists had a right to rule Northern Ireland without reference to the Catholic minority.
Violence returned to the streets in 1970 and 1971, and the troops quickly lost the support they had initially received from the Catholic community. Rather than appearing as their protectors, they were rapidly transformed into another force that was seen as enforcing unionist rule.
During this period paramilitary forces came into being that would make the violence in Northern Ireland more organized and focused. Both communities developed paramilitary movements. These were:
- The Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA, or The Provos). Formed in 1970 after splitting from the Official IRA, the Provisional IRA emerged from the streets of Northern Ireland specifically to defend the Catholic community from attack.
- The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Formed in 1966, they were sworn to defend Northern Ireland's relationship with Britain in the face of Catholic demands for change.
- The Ulster Defence Association (UDA). A more public force than the UVF, with similar aims, the UDA claimed 40,000 members by 1972.
August 1971 witnessed a further upsurge of violence across Northern Ireland. In Derry four days of rioting culminated in two men being shot by the army. The government at Stormont decided to act to calm the situation, and decided that if they took known troublemakers off the streets, the situation would be calmed. On August 9, 1971 the army arrested 342 men, and the process of internment without trial began. Rather than producing calm, internment only inflamed the situation. Those arrested were all from Catholic communities, and the use of the army to arrest suspects reinforced the perception that they were a far from neutral force
The response to internment was swift and violent. Rioting erupted across Northern Ireland, and in three days 22 people were killed, and 7,000 driven from their homes by sectarian acts of arson. The government at Stormont seemed to have completely lost control. With the failure of government and widespread violence on the streets, more young people, on both sides, were convinced that the only way they could secure their future was by joining and supporting the paramilitaries.
The civil rights movement campaigned against internment, which they considered another example of injustice in Northern Ireland. In January 1972 a march was organized in Derry to protest against the ongoing policy of internment. The march was well-attended and was supposed to be a peaceful gathering.
As such protests had often led to rioting, the march was heavily policed by the British army, including the paratroop regiment that was brought to Derry from Belfast for the day. The march ended in terrible bloodshed. The army claimed that they had come under attack from Provisional IRA snipers, and had only returned fire. The marchers contended that the Paratroopers had fired without provocation on unarmed demonstrators. In the event the Paratroopers fired 108 rounds of live ammunition into the crowd, and by the end of the day 13 unarmed protestors were dead
Bloody Sunday is seen as one of the key events in the history of Northern Ireland, and one of the most contested. Although an initial investigation, the Widgery report, found the army blameless, many argued that they were guilty of firing without provocation. The story of what happened on that day was regularly revisited. The pressure to discover conclusively what had happened led to the creation of the Saville Inquiry by the British government in 1998.
The Saville Inquiry was designed to supercede the Widgery report, and address the charges of whitewashing which accompanied that earlier report. The inquiry took the form of a tribunal established under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, and consisted of Lord Saville, the former Chief Justice of New Brunswick William L. Hoyt and John L. Toohey, a former Justice of the High Court of Australia.
The results were published on 15 June 2010. British Prime Minister David Cameron addressed the House of Commons that afternoon where he acknowledged, among other things, that the paratroopers had fired the first shot, had fired on fleeing unarmed civilians, and shot and killed one man who was already wounded. He then apologised on behalf of the British Government.
Cameron described what British soldiers had done as "both unjustified and unjustifiable, it was wrong". He acknowledged that all those who died were unarmed when they were killed by British soldiers and that a British soldier had fired the first shot at civilians. He also said that this was not a premeditated action, though "there was no point in trying to soften or equivocate" as "what happened should never, ever have happened."
These findings, and the public reaction by Cameron, finally gave voice to what had been obvious from the day of the incident, and openly communicated in British government circles for decades. The following 1992 statement from John Major, writing to John Hume, participates in that vein:
The Government made clear in 1974 that those who were killed on "Bloody Sunday" should be regarded as innocent of any allegation that they were shot whilst handling firearms or explosives. I hope that the families of those who died will accept that assurance.
The killings on Bloody Sunday led to another upsurge in violence and a rapid growth in support for the Provisional IRA. The British government realized that they could no longer support the Stormont government in Northern Ireland. Despite some attempts at reform since the late 1960s, the situation had spiraled out of control, and the two communities were more divided than ever. The decision was taken in March 1972 to suspend the government of Northern Ireland and govern directly from London.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s many in the Catholic community in Northern Ireland became completely dissatisfied with the state of affairs there. They felt economically and socially discriminated against and did not believe that the unionist government at Stormont represented their interests. While many supported the initiative of the civil rights movement and nationalist political parties such as the SDLP, the situation did not improve. They felt under attack from loyalist paramilitaries, and had lost faith in the ability of either the RUC or the army to protect them. Instead, many felt that events such as Bloody Sunday simply illustrated the fact that the forces of the state were being used against them.
In such a situation they looked for someone that would protect their interests. In seeking to defend themselves and take action against their attackers, many turned to the Provisional IRA as a force that could serve their interests. The Provisional IRA offered:
- Protection from attacks by loyalist paramilitary and security forces.
- A vehicle for disenfranchised and disillusioned young men and women to take action against their attackers.
- Political arguments linking the problems in Northern Ireland with the unfinished business of 1922.
- A belief that Northern Ireland could not be reformed internally, and that only the creation of a reunited 32-county Ireland could give the Catholic community safety and prosperity.
Initially the Provisional IRA was concerned with the defense of the Catholic community, but as the months passed by, they developed a strategy of bombing economic targets in order to destabilize British rule in Northern Ireland.
While this was an effective strategy, 1971 witnessed another change in direction. On February 6, 1971 Gunner Harris became the first regular solider to be killed by the Provisional IRA. The list of legitimate targets was widened to include members of the British Army, and the officers of the RUC.
In the 1970s and 1980s killings and bombings were a regular feature of life in Northern Ireland. The forces of the state, the Army and the RUC, had to contend with sustained and organized violence from Republican forces, the Provisional IRA, and a range of different Loyalist paramilitary organizations. But what did these different groups want and what did they hope to achieve?
- The Provisional IRA believed that a violent struggle would eventually force the British to decide that they should leave Northern Ireland, and that a 32-county Republic would be created as a result.
- The various loyalist paramilitaries were dedicated to the protection of Northern Ireland and its sovereign relationship with Britain. They argued that the use of violence was justified to support the state and to attack its enemies in the Provisional IRA.
- The British worked on the principle that they had to protect the democratic will of the majority in Northern Ireland, namely the unionist population, who wanted to remain as part of Britain. They used the full force of their political, security, and legal systems to try and achieve this.
All these different aims were clearly contradictory, and the upshot was a situation where various people were killed by the different sides in the conflict. Between 1969 and 1989, 2,761 people were killed as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Of these:
- 623 were killed by loyalist paramilitaries, namely Catholic civilians (72 %), Protestant civilians (18 %), other loyalist paramilitaries (5 %), republican paramilitaries (3 %), and members of the security forces (2 %).
- 1,593 were killed by republican paramilitaries, namely members of the security forces (53 %), Protestant civilians (25 %), Catholic civilians (12 %), other republican paramilitaries (9 %), and loyalist paramilitaries (1 %).
- An estimated 150 were killed by members of the security forces.
In an attempt to control the violence the British introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974, which allowed suspects to be detained without access to legal representation, and authorized the elite SAS to operate in Northern Ireland against Republicans. By December 31 2001 the number of deaths attributed to the Northern Ireland troubles had risen to 3,523, and over 40,000 have been injured.
Clearly such rates of deaths, and the associated high level of injuries, were a tragedy for Northern Ireland. Such levels of violence meant that Northern Ireland ceased to be a normal democratic society. All aspects of life, from housing, education, and sport, through to business development, employment, and culture were all affected. It was clear that the situation could not go unchecked. But by the end of the 1970s, all attempts at finding a political solution to the troubles had failed. No one would concede their core demands, and an embrace of violence appeared more effective than searching for peace.
By the late 1970s the Northern Ireland conflict appeared to many observers to be an intractable problem. While strategies had been used by the British to try and reduce the levels of violence (higher security force numbers on the street, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and better use of intelligence information) they could not make the paramilitaries disappear. There was also an acknowledgment within British government and military circles that they could never defeat the paramilitaries. If a solution was to be found it would have to be a political one. But how could this be managed when the demands of the nationalists and republicans for self-government and Britain's withdrawal were in complete contrast to the demands of the majority unionist population of Northern Ireland who wanted to remain part of Britain? It appeared at the end of the 1970s as if a point of stalemate had been reached, and there was no alternative to an ongoing sectarian conflict.